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Abstract: Sustainability of health financing is a critical issue for all countries, especially now in the
COVID-19 period. The final level of achievements of critical public health goals is connected not
only with the efforts of the people involved, but also with the availability of funding to cover the
costs of the actions needed. One of the “internal sources” providing more resources to cover public
health care costs is effective public procurement in the health care sector. According to existing
scientific literature, a low rate of competition represents one important factor that has a direct negative
impact on the efficiency of public procurement. The aim of our article is to examine the degree of
competitiveness of public procurement in the Czech and Slovak health care systems and its impact on
the final price of a contract. The research fully attested the findings of those studies carried out so far –
the higher the number of tenderers, the lower the final price, even in the Czech and Slovak health
sectors. However, the average number of tenderers is only around two and in the Czech Republic for
more than half of the tenders only one bid was submitted.
Keywords: public procurement; health care; efficiency; competitiveness; Czech Republic; Slovakia
1. Introduction
Health spending in developed countries oscillates from approx. 9 to 18% of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), however, there is no country where this substantial sum fully covers all perceived
health care needs. Health finance on the one hand represents a critical factor “endangering” global
fiscal sustainability, on the other hand these resources are expected to finance the growing health
care needs of the world’s population, as formulated for example by the UN Sustainable Goal 3
“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”. Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) [1] define 13 critical targets for the health care systems of the world, with focus on reducing
the global maternal mortality ratio, reducing neonatal mortality, combating the epidemics of AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and to combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases
and other communicable diseases, reducing premature mortality from non-communicable diseases
and prevention and treatment of substance abuse. SDGs call for achieving universal health coverage,
including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe,
effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.
Especially after the COVID-19 crisis, it will not be possible to achieve the planned critical goals
without a significant increase of efficiency of health expenditures. For most countries it will be very
difficult to add extra (public or private) resources to health care, thus the mobilisation of internal
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reserves by providers is a “must”, to cope with increased health expenditure needs and decreased
health care revenues. There exist numerous mechanisms supporting efficiency increases of health care
spending—many countries for example use public private partnership (PPP) schemes (especially in the
infrastructure area) to address limited health resources and to increase efficiency of health spending.
Improving public procurement by health establishments, which is the focus of our paper, certainly
represents important factors of increased efficiency of health establishments. Worldwide, goods,
services and works amounting to approximately 15% of GDP are purchased in developed countries
through public procurement—this means that purchasing goods, services and works may represent
20–40% of health care expenditures, depending on the weight of salaries in the health care bill. Simple
calculations suggest that improving the efficiency of procurement in a health care sector by 10% (fully
possible for most countries) provides (using data for developed countries) up to an extra 0.5% of GDP to
cover health needs. Well realised procurement in combination with effective use of Health Technology
Assessment [2] in planning procurement needs makes the potential for savings even higher.
Empirical studies (discussed in the literature review part of this paper) fundamentally and
unanimously show that higher competitiveness - the number of tenderers—in public procurement
leads to lower final prices. However, for all sectors, the Czech Republic and Slovakia belong to those
countries with a really small number of bids per tender. According to the European Commission [3],
the number of tenders with only one bidder in 2018 was 50% in the Czech Republic and close to
30% in Slovakia and albeit the situation is slowly improving, both countries are still far behind most
EU countries.
To reflect the above-mentioned challenges, the goal of our article is to examine the situation in
public health care procurement—to measure the rate of competitiveness and its impact on the final
price for both selected countries—the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the analysis, we proceed
according to standard approaches published in international articles as well as by domestic authors
and respond to the most frequent questions connected with this type of research:
1) What is the level of competitiveness in public health care procurement in the Czech Republic and
in Slovakia?
2) What is the impact of the competitiveness on the difference between the forecasted and final price?
3) What is the impact of the method and selection criterion used on the difference between the
forecasted and final price?
By responding to our research goal and defined research questions we do not plan to fill any
existing theory gap—as indicated above, the fact that increased competitiveness in public procurement
saves public money is well documented by many studies (some of them are discussed in the literature
review part of this article). However, we want to enrich the existing knowledge by mapping the
real situation in the selected and under-researched region of Central and Eastern Europe, where both
selected countries are located, and in an under-researched area. The issue of competitiveness/number
of tenders in health care purchasing is very rarely investigated by academic literature probably because
of the fact that this problem is not an important issue in developed countries, however, as we document,
this problem is really urgent for less developed systems and deserves attention. Fifteen years ago,
Vlach et al. [4] published a short report benchmarking the economy of public procurement in Slovak
hospitals and found excessive inefficiencies. When the findings were presented to the general public,
the director of the least performing hospital responded “Our task is to treat patients, not to procure”
(Nemec [5]). However, if a hospital is losing millions by ineffective procurement, access for patients to
treatment financed from public resources is restricted.
2. Public Procurement in Health Care
The number of papers dealing with acquirement of goods, services and works in the health
care sector is relatively large. Perhaps the most comprehensive paper mapping health procurement
procedures in Europe is that by Decarolis and Giorgiantonio [6]. Their paper analyses the public
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procurement of orthopedic implants and related medical devices in Europe. Using the data covering
the universe of EU public tenders for the period 2009–2014 the authors describe the key empirical
features of the market with regard to awarding procedures and contractual forms and discuss the
implications for quality, competitiveness, corruption and product innovation.
There are also very many articles dealing with different issues of the public-private interface
in the acquirement of goods, services and works for health care needs. Such papers start from a
very broad concept of public-private ties and related organisational strategy, managerial, and policy
implications [7].
It is necessary to also mention the group of authors who try to introduce and analyse the
public-private partnerships as the tool to involve the private sector in developing, financing and
providing health infrastructure and services and related critical organisational strategy, management
and policy implications [8]. More and more countries in the world are using public-private partnerships
to acquire public sector infrastructure and services [9] (however, this is not the case of either of the
investigated countries whose PPPs are connected with infrastructure and local communal services
only [10]). The concept of PPP is closely related with public procurement, which is the focus of our
paper. However, under PPP the complex set of issues needs to be examined and managed—the
public-private interface is much more comprehensive compared to procurement, where the goal is just
to assure that public bodies purchase in effective and efficient (economical) ways. Torchia et al. [11]
delivered in their paper the literature review of 46 articles on this topic. Their findings suggest that
although PPPs are used to address internationally emerging public health issues, questions as to their
actual effectiveness, efficiency and convenience, still remain problematic. One of the key words for
them is “partners”, the other two of efficiency and effectiveness—these factors are also critical for a
much more simple public procurement process (which should also not be just about competition—see
any of the current articles on sustainable procurement—for example Walker et al. [12]).
Many authors focus on the issue and importance of contracts and contract management.
Essig et al. [13] for example try to advance the understanding of performance-based contracting,
other authors deal with more concrete aspects of contract and contract management and document
that low quality contract management is an important source of inefficiencies (studies focusing directly
on the Czech and Slovak environment from this point of view exist—e.g., [14–16].
However, the focus of this paper is much narrower. The authors deal exclusively with one small,
albeit really important element of the public-private interface in the acquirement of goods, services
and works for health care needs as documented by this text, namely competitiveness and its impact on
the final price of the realised tender. The authors are aware that this single element does not work
independently from other success-failure factors, but they also feel that an in-depth evaluation of the
particular elements of a large system is beneficiary and necessary to obtain a full picture.
According to the findings of the scientific literature, a low rate of competitiveness has a direct
impact on the efficiency of public procurement (hereinafter referred to as ‘procurement’), which is most
often assessed by comparing the estimated value of the contract with the tender price. As one of the
most frequently cited authors in this area, Gupta [17] found that six–eight tenderers are needed to
achieve the highest competitiveness and that any further increase in the number of tenderers does not
affect the final price (the author analysed the area of highway infrastructure construction in Florida
from 1981 to 1986, the total sample consisted of 1937 tenders). Gupta [17] calculated that increasing
the number of tenderers from two to eight represented achieving an additional saving of 12–14%
on average (when analysing data adjusted for extreme values, where the highest competitiveness
was achieved with six tenderers, the increase in the number of tenderers from two to six resulted in
additional savings of 9 to 10% on average).
Brannman et al. [18] investigated the effect of competitiveness on price, utilising data from three
different areas: timber sales (where oral auctions were additionally frequent), oilfield sales (with very
inaccurate estimates of oil content) and government bond sales—the findings of this research can
also be applied to procurement. The work identified the determinants that affect the final price of
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the auction (type of goods/services, characteristics of bidders, characteristics of the industry, type of
auction used and number of bidders). In four out of six types of auctions, the highest competitiveness
was achieved with seven to eight bidders and with five bidders in the other two types of auctions.
Gomez-Lobo and Szymanski [19] investigated the relationship between costs and numbers of
bidders for U.K. local authorities’ refuse collection contracts. They found that a higher number of bids
is associated with a lower cost of service. Similar results were delivered by Cubbin et al. [20] for the
same service.
Atsushi [21] focused on procurement in 26 developing countries, with data from 214 cases from
April 1999 to March 2005. The author found that an incrementation in the number of tenderers by an
average of 1% brings savings of 0.2% and the state of highest competitiveness was achieved with a
participation of eight tenderers. When the number of tenderers is more than eight, the cost-cutting
effect is significantly lost.
Gineitienė and Šerpytis [22] analysed procurement of technically identical and standardised goods.
The results were similar to those of the previous authors and ergo, with the incrementing number of
tenderers, the price is lower than the estimated price. The authors additionally found that with an
incrementation from one tenderer to two, significant savings were achieved (for some goods even
higher than 10 or 20%).
Ilke et al. [23] analysed competitiveness in procurement in Turkey between 2004 and 2006,
utilising data from 90,089 tenders. The results were similar to the abovementioned authors, albeit each
supplemental tenderer reduced the resulting price on average by 3.9%. The authors additionally found
that tenders with a higher forecasted value would attract more tenderers on average, and hence the
size had a direct effect on the number of tenderers.
Kuhlman and Johnson [24] analysed constructions of U.S. highway infrastructure. Their findings,
unlike those of e.g., Ilke et al. [23], show that the size of the procurement does not affect the number of
tenderers, but substantiated the disproportionate relationship between the number of tenderers and
the resulting price. Furthermore, they found that the failure to disclose the forecasted value of the
contract (calculated but kept secret) incremented the uncertainty among tenderers and resulted in a
lower price compared to those countries that published the forecasted value of contracts.
The research on the level of competitiveness and its impacts on the procurement results is also
relatively frequent in the conditions of the Czech and Slovak Republics. Soudek and Skuhrovec [25]
analysed procurements of homogeneous products in the Czech Republic, namely electricity and natural
gas. The advantage of the analysis of homogeneous goods is the facileness of comparability with
the market price, which the authors obtained from the short-term commodity exchange of OTE a.s.
electricity and gas in the Czech Republic. The authors pointed out several important findings in their
work, according to which, contracting authorities regularly overestimate the forecasted value of the
contract and ergo their price forecast does not correspond to the current market price. Of interest
is that the greatest impact on the final price is due to the chosen method; the utilisation of open
tender decremented the achieved price on average by 7%. On average, each supplemental tenderer
decremented the final price by 1%. The impact of the number of tenderers on the resulting price was
statistically insignificant in the case of gas supply, which may also be related to an insufficient amount of
data. A consequential contribution of Soudek and Skuhrovec [25] is the comparison of the market price,
the forecasted value of the contract and the resulting price, and found that despite the overestimation
of the forecasted value of the contract, the distinctions between the resulting price and the market
price decrease over time thereby bringing savings to the public finances. On average, four tenderers
participated in electrical energy procurements and 3.3 tenderers in natural gas procurements.
Pavel [26] analysed the impact of competitiveness on the price of construction of road and railway
transport infrastructure in the Czech Republic in the period 2004–2009. In his work, he utilised the
relationship of the forecasted value of the contract and the tender price and found that, on average,
each additional tenderer reduced the resulting price by 3.27%. Similar to Soudek and Skuhrovec [25],
he found that the utilisation of restricted tender increases the price, in this case by an average of
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11.56% of the forecasted contract value. An important finding in Pavel’s work [26] is the fact that,
as the number of offers increments, the tender price decrements, but the share of the five largest
construction companies in the total volume of contracts does not decrement. The author here points
out that a vigorous competitive environment forces the top five companies in the market to lower their
prices to maintain their market share and win the contract. In his other study Pavel [27] investigated
the relationship between the number of bidders and the final price for the road building industry.
The results are similar—the calculated extra price decrease for a second tenderer was 7.9%, for a third
7%, for a sixth only 4.5% and the competition effect disappeared for PP with ten bidders. The summary
of findings of this author on the efficiency of public procurement is provided by Pavel [28].
Another work that examined in more detail the relationship between competitiveness and the
resulting price is the analysis of Šípoš and Klátik [29], where the authors focused on subliminal,
below and above threshold procurements in Slovakia in 2012. The analysis focused not only on
competitiveness, but also on the impact of utilising e-auctions and of the procedures used. The authors
found that as the number of tenderers incremented, the resulting price of tenders declined on average
(compared to the forecasted value of the contract), but the relative savings when two tenderers
participated were higher than when three and four tenderers participated. The highest savings were
achieved with five or more tenderers. According to the authors, using e-auction achieved additional
savings of 5%.
Sičáková-Beblavá, Klátik and Beblavý [30] also examined the effect of competitiveness on the final
price. The authors examined the impact of e-auction on the efficiency of procurement in a sample of
725 cases between 2008 and 2010 in 32 public sector organisations in Slovakia. The authors’ findings
point to the positive impact of e-auction on the efficiency. According to their findings, the first bid
reduces the price by an average of 4% and each subsequent bid reduces it by 84% of the precedent
reduction. According to the authors, three bidders should be enough to achieve 10% savings and,
according to the authors, savings of up to 20% can be achieved.
Grega [31] in his early study presents very similar findings–when five or more tenderers were
involved in the PP, the greatest savings were achieved compared to the forecasted contract value.
The author returned to the topic also in other publications. The most detailed and comprehensive
analysis is delivered by Grega [32]. The author first calculated the level of competitiveness in the Czech
(2008–2013) and Slovak (2010–2014) procurement of goods, services and works. He found that in both
countries the highest number of bids was received for works and the lowest for goods (somewhat of a
surprise, compared to other studies). The calculation of the impact of the number of bidders on the
final price was delivered only for Slovakia on the sample of 27,234 procurements between 1 January
2009 and 12 August 2014. His results are similar to others: the calculated price decrease for a second
tenderer was 7.7%, for a third 8.9%, for a fourth tenderer 11.75% and the peak 16.9% was achieved in
PP with five tenderers. Other papers related to the topic—and with similar findings—by Grega and
different co-authors are for example Grega et al. [33], Nemec et al. [34], Nemec et al. [35], Sumpikova
et al. [36] 2016 and Grega and Nemec [37,38].
3. Methodology
In our research we utilise the most commonly used approach for quantifying the efficiency of
PP—comparing the forecasted value of the contract with the final tender price, customarily utilising
the lowest price as the criterion. It is a transparent, unpretentious and expeditious way to evaluate,
even though its use is associated with certain problems. The main limit of this method is a phenomenon
called fictitious savings - setting the higher forecasted value of the contract is propitious for the
contracting authority because it can achieve higher (albeit fictitious) savings. According to some
authors, the tender price should be compared to the market price (Soudek and Skuhrovec [25],
Millet et al. [39] and others) and not the forecasted price. The quandary is that the market price is not
always affordable and clearly determinable, especially for services and construction work. For example,
sizably voluminous-scale construction work, information systems or legal and advisory services should
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not be compared with the price on the market and their comparison, if any, should be viewed with
reservation. Utilising the market price as a benchmark is felicitous for homogeneous goods and
services purchased on a regular basis, with a precise quality specification (in the case of some products
of a generally known quality) and with an adequate number of suppliers—and also for a shorter
period of time so that prices are impervious to inflation or technical progress. In our case, due to the
abovementioned limits and the sizably voluminous sample size, the only solution was to utilise a
simple procedure to compare the forecasted and final price, albeit we are cognizant of its limitations.
The main method is our own primary quantitative research, covering a fully comprehensive and
representative sample. When calculating the achieved savings, we processed a complete sample of
all procurements in the Czech and Slovak health services for 2019 (all registered PPs for the given
period—almost 3000 cases—are covered and their information processed by us). Data on individual
PPs were obtained from the national registers of the Public Procurement Office and processed by the
authors of this article. We use five variables to make statistics analysis (Table 1). The most important
variable is savings. We use the following formula to count it:
savings =
f inal price− f orecasted price
f orecasted price
We have omitted the extreme values (savings or overspendings over 60%) that could have been
caused by transcription errors or major errors in estimating the forecasted PP price and cannot be caused
by regular market competitiveness. To check for possible irregularities caused by a one-year picture
we also analysed compete samples of the Slovak health care procurements for the period 2014–2018.
These data are not directly used in this study, but confirm that the 2019 situation is fully representative.
Table 1. Summary of variables.
Variable Type Description
Savings Real numbers Percentage of savings (from −0.6 to 0.6): Positive numbersdenote savings, minus numbers overresponding
Bids Integer Number of submitted offers (1-8)
Procurement method binary 0-Negotiation 1-Tender
State binary 0-Czechia 1-Slovakia
Selection criterion binary 0-Price 1-MEAT
Source: authors.
To process an extensive set of collected data by quantitative methods we use simple descriptive
statistics, and, where appropriate, also correlation and regression. We compare savings and other











where x and y denote arithmetic means. We use a linear regression model with dependent variable
savings (Y) and k independent variables (Xi):




We also apply a qualitative research method to support the discussion part of this paper. To be
able to explain the findings better we realised two interviews with intentionally selected experts. In the
Czech Republic we interviewed a top academic expert focusing on efficiency of public procurement.
In Slovakia we interviewed a top practitioner, the head of the private consultancy firm in procurement.
Thanks to this, both academic and practice perspectives are covered (the number of interviews is
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intentionally limited to two, because the goal of these interviews was to provide the needed specific
explanation of purposes for our negative findings).
4. Results
We present descriptive statistics of variables in Table 2. Variable savings is limited to interval from
−0.6 to 0.6. Variable bids is transformed. We determine the value of eight as the maximum because
values higher than eight appear rarely. There are 474 public procurements with missing variable
selection criterion because the Slovakia database does not include this information. This is why we
analyse selection criterion in the context of the Czech selection procedure only.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Average Median Min Max Std. Dev. Q0.05. Q0.95. Missing Obs.
Savings 7.24 1.30 −59.01 59.75 15.72 −9.16 41.50 0
Bids 1.90 1 1 8 1 1 4 0
Procurement method 0.98 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
State 0.18 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Selection criterion 0.09 0 0 1 0 0 1 474
Source: authors.
The data about the average number of offers submitted are very similar for the Czech Republic and
Slovakia (and similar to the general pattern of low competitiveness in procurement for both countries).
The average number of bids is below two for the Czech Republic and slightly over two in Slovakia
(Figure 1).
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Given the low competitiveness, procurement in the Czech and Slovak health sectors is characterised
by a high proportion of tenders with one tenderer—see Figure 2. The situation in Slovakia is somewhat
better, but still approximately one fourth of cases in the monitored period were awarded without any
real competition between tenderers (however, in the most expensive field of procurement of medical
technology, this figure is almost 60%). The situation in the Czech Republic is critical.
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Table 3. Correlations between the number of bids and savings.
Czech Republic Slovakia Total
Correlation coefficient 0.269780787 0.116284962 0.243082158
Critical value 5% 0.0418 0.0901 0.0379
Number of observations 2196 474 2670
Source: authors.
Regression models confirm statistical dependence between independent and dependent variables,
but their prediction value is limited because of the low level of the determinacy coefficient (Tables 4
and 5).
Table 4. Regression: Czech Republic.
Coefficient Standard Error t-Share p-Value Significance Level
const 1.04167 0.560161 1.86 0.0631 α = 0.1
bids 3.34971 0.255252 13.12 <0.0001 α = 0.01
Determinacy coefficient: 0.072782
Adjusted determinacy coefficient: 0.072359
F(1, 2194): 172.2172
p-value(F): 6.26 × 10−38
Source: authors.
Table 5. Regression: Slovakia.
Coefficient Standard Error t-Share p-Value Significance Level
const 4.96933 1.45567 3.414 0.0007 α = 0.01
bids 1.34075 0.52711 2.544 0.0113 α = 0.05
Determinacy coefficient: 0.01352




We also tried to calculate the relationship between savings and the procurement method
used—Figure 4. The results presented by the simple statistics are rather surprising—in the Czech
Republic the difference is marginal and in Slovakia non-competitive selection may lead to higher
savings. We also tested the sample by correlation and regression analysis; however, for both methods
the results are not statistically significant.
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Finally, Figure 5 shows the level of savings in relation to the selection criterion (lowest price—most
economically advantageous bid—MEAT) used—and is calculated only for the Czech Republic, because
all procurements in Slovakia in 2019 used the lowest price criterion. We also tested the sample by
correlation and regression analysis; however, also in this case the results are not statistically significant
for both methods.
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The fact that two countries are analysed would suggest that a comparative case study method
should be more extensively used in this article. However, the results (for non-extreme values) are
very similar for both countries and comprehensive comparisons would not help in achieving the
main goal of this article. Slovakia achieves a slightly higher level of competitiveness and a slightly
higher level of savings, but the differences (especially when taking into account methodological
problems – fictitious savings) are just marginal. For both countries, the situation is critical and calls for
significant improvements.
The main quandary identified is a very low rate of competitiveness, which limits the efficiency
of procurement in the Czech and Slovak healthcare. This fact raises an obvious question—why is
the level of competitiveness so limited—are objective (such as a limited size of market) or subjective
factors (corruption—active and passive waste) behind it? Two interviews have been organised by
the authors to help us to respond to this question, which is not only the specific issue of health care
procurement, but the general fact for the whole procurement system in both countries. The response of
the Czech academician was very disheartening—according to his opinion the core factor is collusion
(corruption) and the size of supplying markets plays only a marginal role. The opinion of the
Slovak expert—practitioner—was very similar; however, he mentioned also the factor of excessive
bureaucratisation of procurement processes, which limits the will of firms to compete. Also, according
to his opinion, the market capacity is not any issue—for well-designed and fair tender the market
generates sufficient number of bids.
The opinion of experts that procurement systems in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are the
area of collusion agreements and not of fair competition is already confirmed by most recent studies
about this topic based on local data and the local situation. Langr [40], in his comprehensive study,
directly characterises how the procurement in the Czech Republic functions for most cases. Normally
the standard procurement process should include three phases—preparation of tender, tendering and
execution. However, in the environment of systemic corruption, two more phases need to be added:
phase 0, where collusions are negotiated and the winner and final price are pre-determined and phase
4 where profits are redistributed between the actors involved. The most frequently used tools to limit
the competitiveness are a too restrictive description of the object of procurement and too restrictive
definition of the qualification criteria.
The opinion of experts and of Langr [40] is supported also by the recent article by Placek et al. [41].
Their paper deals with the issue of overpricing of public procurement in low-performing EU countries
and examines a uniquely large sample of public procurement in eleven Central and Eastern European
countries. The results indicate that institutional factors have a greater impact on overpricing than
individual decisions by the contracting authority. This analysis provides interesting results and also
draws attention to behaviour that is not typical of the better established and more advanced EU
countries. According to Vesely [42] and some other authors, the source for this situation is, to a
large extent, path-dependency—petty corruption was a typical feature of the so-called “socialist”
society, and the change of the system opened the space for massive—systemic—large scale corruption,
which is tolerated by citizens (Orviska and Hudson [43] or Hunady [44]) and exaggerated by limited
accountability and responsibility of politicians and top civil servants (Thijs et al. [45]) and also by a
limited managerial culture in the “post-soviet” countries (see for example Spacek and Hornakova [46],
Spacek and Pucek [47], Spacek [48] and Nemec [49].
6. Conclusions
The goal of this article was rather simple—to analyse and to document the level of competitiveness
in Czech and Slovak health care procurement and to assess its impact on the efficiency of health care
public procurement results (final price).
From the point of general theory, the processing of data on procurement in the Czech and Slovak
public healthcare sectors for the year 2019 fully attested the findings of the studies carried out so far
which analysed the relationship between competitiveness in PP and the final price. Even in this sector,
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a higher number of offers clearly engenders a lower final price. From the data obtained, we are unable
to state the optimum rate of competitiveness—most of the abovementioned studies estimated that
the optimum number of bids oscillates around 6, whereas in the Czech and Slovak health sectors the
average number of bids oscillates around two and any calculations of results for more than three bids
are misleading, due to the too low number of cases in the sample.
The core problem found is the fact that the potential of competitiveness is not utilised by health
care establishments to obtain better prices (and quality) of purchased goods, services and works.
On the contrary, we are able to document large scale waste of resources in the sector, which, according
to interviewed experts and existing academic studies is not related to any objective environmental
factors, but is the result or consequence of systemic corruption prevalent in the public sectors of both
selected countries.
Despite the relatively narrow scope of the investigations, our findings are critical for the future
of the health systems in both selected countries (and with high probability in the whole Central
and Eastern Europe region and in similar transitional or developing countries). Public health care
establishments, which dominate the health sectors in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, realise inefficient
procurement processes. The costs are borne by patients, who have to wait for necessary treatment,
and by the state, which periodically covers existing hospital debts (for more see for example Bjorkman
and Nemec [50].
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